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delegated to a drainage district: William R. Compton Co. v. Farme's
Trust Co., 279 S.W. 746 (Mo. App., 1925); nor to a county: Glynn
County v. Brunswick Terminal Co., ioI Ga. 244, 28 S.E. 604
(1897); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brumell, State Supt. of
Banks, 12F(2d) 307 (1926); Phillips v. Yates Center National Bank
(Phillips v. Gillis) 98 Kan. 383, 158 Pac. 23, L.R.A. 19 17A, 68o
(1916); nor to a municipal corporation: People v. Home State Bank
of Grant Park, 338 II1. 179, 17o N.E. 205 (1930); In re Northern
Bank, 85 Misc. 594, 148 N.Y.S. 70 (1914) aff'd. 163 App. Div. 974,
148 N.Y.S. 70 (1914) further aff'd. 212 N.Y. 6o8, io6 N.E. 749
( 1914) ; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Rainey, I 2o Tenn.
357, 113 S.W. 397 (1907); contra Denver v. Stenger, 295 Fed. 809
(1924). A political subdivision has been distinguished from an agency
of the state, such as a university, the latter being entitled to exercise the
state's common law sovereign prerogative. University of Tennessee v.
Peoples Bank, et al., 157 Tenn. 87, 6 S.W. (2d) 328.
JUsTIN H. FOLKERTH.
WHAT CONSTITUTES A FARMER UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY
ACT?
On May 15, 1935, section 4 b of the bankruptcy act was amended
to provide, "Any natural person, except a wage earner or a farmer,
* . . may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt upon default or an
impartial trial, and shall be subject to the provisions and entitled to the
benefits of this title."' At the same time section 75r was amended to
provide, "For the purposes of this section, section 4 b, and section 74,
the term 'farmer' includes2 not only an individual who is primarily bona
fide personally engaged in producing products of the soil, but also any
individual who is primarily bona fide personally engaged in dairy farm-
ing, the production of poultry or livestock, or the production of poultry
products or livestock products in their unmanufactured state, or the
IBankruptcy Act, sec. 4b, 49 Stat. 246, II U.S.C.A. sec. 22b. (1935);
formerly "Any natural person, except a wage earner or a person engaged
chiefly in farming or the tillage of the soil . . . .may be adjudged an
involuntary bankrupt." Bankruptcy Act of 1898, sec. 4 b, 30 Stat. 547, I1
U.S.C.A., sec. Z2b.
2 The United States Supreme Court recently held that the word "include"
was not a term of exclusion, as used in section i (9), defining a creditor.
American Surety Co. of New York v. Mariotta, 287 U.S. 513, 77 L.Ed. 466,
53 S. Ct. 238.
principal part of whose income is derived from any one or more of the
foregoing operations, and includes the personal representative of a
deceased farmer; and a farmer shall be deemed a resident of any county
in which such operations occur." 3
A survey of cases shows the extent to which the present amendment
changes or codifies the rule of former decisions. In the past, in interpret-
ing the provision exempting "natural persons," the reasoning of the
courts has exempted farming partnerships,' but not corporations engaged
in farming.' However, farming corporations are included in the agri-
cultural composition-and- extensions section if at least 75% of the stock
is owned by actual farmers.6 A stockholder-officer in a farming corpora-
tion, who manages the corporation's farms, is within the exemption.'
The words "primarily engaged," used in the present amendment,
seem to incorporate the meaning which was formerly expressed in the
provision "chiefly engaged." Hence the reasoning of former cases is
applicable. To determine if the debtor is "chiefly engaged in farming,"
all activities and pursuits must be considered.' Each case must be decided
on its own peculiar facts."
The present act provides that the debtor must be "bona fide" en-
gaged in farming. Most courts hold that the debtor's occupation is to
Bankruptcy Act, sec. 75r, 49 Stat. 246, I I U.S.C.A. sec. 203r. (May
15, 1935) formerly, "For the purpose of this section and section 74, the term
'farmer' means any individual who is personally bona fide engaged primarily
in farming operations or the principal part of- whose income is derived from
farming operations, and includes the personal representative of a deceased
farmer; and a farmer shall be deemed a resident of any county in which such
farming operations occur." Bankruptcy Act, sec. 75r, 47 Stat. 1470, 1IU.S.C.A., sec. 203r. (1933).
'Sill's Sons v. American Nat'l Bank, 209 Fed. 749, (C.C.A. 7th Cir.,
1913) ; Sutherland Medical Co. v. Rik & Bailey (D.C. Ga. I9O9).
In re Lake Jackson Sugar Co., 129 Fed. 640 (D.C. Tex. 1904).
Bankruptcy Act, sec. 75s., 49 Stat. 942, I i U.S.C.A., sec. 203s.
(1935).
7 Evans v. Florida National Bank, 38 Fed. (2d) 627 (C.C.A. 5th Cir.
1930). But a farm laborer is not a farmer within the meaning of section 75.
In re Fullagar, 8 Fed. Supp. 6oz (D.C.N.Y. 1934).
8 American Agricultural Chemical Co. v. Brinkley, 194 Fed. 411 (C.C.A.
4 th Cir. i912); In re Disney, 219 Fed. 294 (D.C. Md. 1915); In re
Brown, 253 Fed. 357 (C.C.A. 9 th Cir. i918); In re Macklem, 2z Fed.(2d) 426 (D.C. Md. 1927); Harris v. Tapp, 235 Fed. 918 (D.C. Ga.
1916).
Isn re Mackey, i1o Fed. 355 (D.C. Del. I9oi); In re Click, 26 Fed.
(2d) 398 (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1928).
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be determined as of the date of the act of bankruptcy.'" A few courts
have considered the problem of changes of occupation into an exempt
class prior to the act of bankruptcy. Some of these have allowed immun-
ity on the theory that a change in good faith is valid," while others
have rather arbitrarily chosen to apply the date of acquisition of the
debts.'
Prior to the 1933 amendment, courts differed in the interpretation
of the clause "chiefly engaged in farming or tillage of the soil." Some
courts held the terms "farming" and "tillage" were synonymous"
while other reached the conclusion that the terms were not co-exten-
sive.' 4 A court which considered the terms synonymous held a dairy
farmer was exempt if his dairying was merely incidental to his general
farming. 5 Courts holding the terms not to be synonymous did not pass
on the question of the status of a dairy farmer; but it would seem that
they might have considered a dairyman a farmer even though he was
primarily engaged in the dairy business and not pursuing it merely as an
incident to tillage of the soil. The express provision of the present
'amendment exempts the debtor who is primarily engaged in dairy
farming.
10 Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Shelhorse, 2z8 Fed. 493 (C.C.A.
4 th Cir. 1915); In re Disney, z19 Fed. z94 (D.C. Md. i9 15); Counts v.
Columbus Buggy Co., io Fed. 748 (C.C.A. 4 th Cir. 1913) ; In re Leland,
185 Fed. 830 (D.C. Mich. i9IO); Ii re Beiseker & Martin, 277 Fed. io0
(D. C. Mont. i92I). The United States Supreme Court, by inference,
seems to have adopted this view by refusing to consider an appeal from a case
so holding. Flickinger v. First. Nat. Bank of Vandalia, Ill., 145 Fed. x62
(C.C.A. 6th Cir. i9o6); certiorari denied, Z03 U.S. 595, 51 L.Ed. 332
(i9o6). Contra: In re Burgin, 173 Fed. 726 (D.C. Ala. i9o9); In re
Wakefield, i8z Fed. 247 (D.C. Cal. i9io); In re Crenshaw, 156 Fed. 638
(D.C. Ala. 1907) ; Tiffany v. La Plume Condensed Milk Co., 1i Fed. 444
(D.C. Pa. 1905). When the debtor has engaged in farming subsequent to
the act of bankruptcy it has been held, "The excepted occupations are not
designed as a refuge for insolvent debtors laden with property and fleeing
from other callings." In re Luckhardt, ioi Fed. 807, 8o9 (D.C. Kan.
i9oo) ; approved in In re Mackey, iio Fed. 355 (D.C. Del. i9oi).
"In re Folkstad, 199 Fed. 363 (D.C. Mont. i9i2); In re Inman, 57
Fed. (zd) 595 (D.C. Wyo. 1932).
" First Nat. Bank of Bode v. Williams, 3 ' Fed. (2d) 749 (C.C.A. 8th
Cir. i9z9); Smith v. Brownsville State Bank, 15 Fed. (2d) 792 (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1926); Harris v. Tapp, 235 Fed. 918 (D.C. Ga. i916).
"aHart-Parr Co. v. Barkley, 231 Fed. 913 (C.C.A. 8th Cir. I916);
Matter of Brown, 284 Fed. 899 (D.C. Mo. i9z2); Matter of Stubbs, z8i
Fed. 568 (D.C. Wyo. I9z2).
14Robertson v. Dwyer, 184 Fed. 88o (C.C.A. 7 th Cir. i9ii); In re
Thompson, 1o Fed. z87 (D.C. Ia. i9oo).
15 Gregg v. Mitchell, i66 Fed. 7z5 (C.C.A. 6th Cir. i909).
Livestock raising has been held to be farming by courts which con-
sidered "tillage of the soil" and "farming" as not co-extensive,' 6 but a
cattle rancher was held not exempt by a court which construed the
terms to be synonymous. 7 The present amendment exempts a person
who is "primarily engaged in the production of poultry or livestock, or
the production of poultry products or livestock products in their unmanu-
factured state." The general definition'" of the word "produce," as
given by Webster, would certainly include the stock raiser, but the
stock feeder would be exempt only if the economic definition' 9 is
followed.
Prior to the 1933 amendment mere ownership of a farm was not
sufficient to exempt a debtor from the involuntary bankruptcy provi-
sion,"0 even though the farm was leased on shares-the debtor also had
to prove that he was "chiefly engaged in farming."'" The debtor has
been held exempt although incidentally a private banker,22 storekeeper,2"
18 In re Thompson, 102 Fed. 287 (D.C. Ia. I9OO); Robertson v. Dwyer,
supra; Hoffschlaeger Co. v. Napp, (D.C. Hawaii 1904).
17 In re Stubbs, 28x Fed. 568 (D.C. Wyo. 1922); and see In re Palma
Bros., 8 Fed. Supp. 920 (D.C. Nev. 1934)
, 
where a person engaged primarily
in raising sheep was held not to be a farmer.
"8 "To bring forth, as young or as a natural product or growth, to give
birth to, to bear."
1' "The creation of economic value, the making of goods available for
human wants."
2I In re Johnson, i49 Fed. 864 (D.C. N.Y. 1907); In re Matson, 123
Fed. 743 (D.C. Pa. 1903). However, an elderly woman, living in the village
but owning a farm run on shares by her son and having some voice in the
management was held exempt, Matter of Cox, 9 Fed. Supp. 244 (D.C. Ill.
1935); and an aged woman, who continued to reside on the farm after her
husband's death, under agreement with her son for division of profits, doing
such housework as she was able was held immune, In re Brais, 15 Fed. (zd)
693 (C.C.A. 7 th Cir. 1926); similarly as to a debtor who moved to town,
leasing his farm but helping when able and being consulted about the crops,
In7 re Glick, z6 Fed. (2d) 398 (C.C.A. 7 th Cir. 1928) and In re Tyler,
284 Fed. 152 (D.C. Ia. 1922).
21 In re Glass, 53 Fed. (2d) 844 (C.C.A. 7 th Cir. 1931), even though
the owner occasionally worked on the farm and was consulted as to the crops.
22 Couts v. Townsend, 126 Fed. 249 (D.C. Ky. 1903) ; In re Beiseker &
Martin, 277 Fed. 1oo (D.C. Mont. i9zi).
2'" American Agricultural Chemical Co. v. Brinkley, supra; Rise v. Bord-
ner, 14o Fed. 566 (D.C. Pa. 1905); and where a debtor maintained a com-
missary on a large plantation he was held exempt. WulAern v. Drake, 12O
Fed. 493 (C.C.A. 4 th Cir. 1903).
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lawyer," or member of a canning partenership, where he was principally
engaged in farming operations.25
In 1933 the operations included in the section defining farmer
were supplemented by the provision "or the principal part of whose
income is derived from any one or more of the foregoing operations."
From a cursory inspection of this provision one might believe that its
object is to include the retired farmer, hitherto excluded because he
was no longer primarily engaged in farming.26 The few cases that have
arisen since the amendment have not involved a retired farmer. In
these cases the debtor has been engaged in another business too, and the
courts have had to resolve the conflict between the provisions "primarily
engaged" and "or the principal part of whose income is derived from
any one or more of the foregoing operations." However, the statements
of the Courts have been broad enough to exclude the retired farmer on
the same grounds that he was formerly excluded. Thus, one of these
Courts said that there is little distinction between the phrases "engaged
chiefly in farming," "personally-primarily engaged in farming," and
"the principal part of whose income is derived from farming oper-
ations."27 Another court came to the conclusion that Congress intended
that in all cases the individual must be engaged primarily in farming op-
erations, and that the additional clause, "or the principal part of whose in-
come is derived from farming operations," was inserted as a precaution
against a bona fide farmer being otherwise classed when during bad years
he is forced to engage in some o*ther occupation to earn a livelihood.2 " It
may be questioned whether Congress passed the amendment with the
intent attributed to it by the above cases-to exclude the farm owner
who is primarily engaged in an occupation other than farming;" and
2 4 I re Hoy, 137 Fed. 175 (D.C. Ia. 19o5).25Matter of Disney, 2I9 Fed. 294 (D.C. Md. 1915); but c.f. In re
M acklin, 22 Fed. (2d) 426 (D.C. Md. 1927), where the debtor was held
to be a canner and not a farmer. It has been held that a debtor who is chiefly
engaged in threshing for hire grain raised by others is not within the exemp-
tion. Hart-Parr Co. v. Barkley, supra.
26 See notes 2o and 21 supra.
27 In re Day, so Fed. Supp. 948 (D.C. Cal. 1935).
2 8 In re Hilliker, 9 Fed. Supp. 948 (D.C. Cal. 1935). Income has been
held to mean gross income. In re Knight, 9 Fed. Supp. 5o2 (D.C. Conn.
1934).
29 See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 79 L. Ed. 1593,
16io, 295 U.S. 555, 55 S. Ct. 854 (1935). In a dictum the United States
Supreme Court commented on section 75r and observed that the act affords
relief "not only to those owners who operate their farms, but also to all indi-
vidual landlords the 'principal part of whose income is derived' from the
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further, if such was the intent whether the retired farmer should be
excluded for the reason that he is primarily engaged in no occupation.
The.amendment provides that a farmer, as the term is used in sec-
tions 4 b, 74 and 75, includes a deceased farmer's personal representa-
tive. Since the farmer is exempted, by section 4 b, from involuntary
bankruptcy, the personal representative would also be entitled to his
immunity. Therefore, it would seem that the sole purpose of this
provision is to permit the deceased farmer's personal representative to
file a voluntary petition under section 74 and 75.30
It is now provided that a farmer shall be deemed a resident of any
county in which his farming operations occur. Formerly the farmer's
residence was a question of fact to be determined from the circumstances
of the case. 3 Now it seems that farming within the county is sufficient
for jurisdiction. CARL R. BULLOCK.
CONDITIONAL SALES
CONDITIONAL SALE - UNRECORDED - PRIORITY OF VENDEE'S
RECEIVER OVER VENDOR
Defendant and McWeb's, Inc., entered into a conditional sales
agreement for the sale of a beer cooler, title to remain in the vendor
until payment of the purchase price. The property was delivered, but
payments were not made nor the contract filed for recording. At the
request of one of the creditors of McWeb's, Inc., one Doyle was
appointed receiver for that company. The defendant was made a party
to the suit with leave to plead and he filed a cross petition claiming the
beer cooler. The Supreme Court held that failure to file the conditional
sales contract rendered it invalid as to creditors of the vendee, and that
the appointment of the receiver amounted to an equitable execution,
and his seizure of the property to an equitable levy. Doyle v. Yoho
Hooker Youngstown Co., 130 Ohio St. 400, 2oo N.E. 123, 20 Ohio
Abs. 17 (1936).
At common law the right and title of a conditional vendor are in
no way affected by the appointment of a receiver for the conditional
vendee for the reason that the receiver stands in the shoes of the vendee
'farming operations' of share croppers or other tenants; and, among these
landlords, to persons who are merely capitalist absentees." See 15 Oregon
L. Rev. 6z (x935).
30 See In re Day, io Fed. Supp. 229 (D.C. Ili. 1935).
31 Collier On Bankruptcy (3 Ed., 1923), p. 61.
